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I
One of the major recurring themes in the literature on suicide is that of the desirability of a more nearly neutral definition of the concept. And despite the numerous disagreements over the various aspects of suicide, many of the combatants agree that a more nearly value-free explication of the concept would not only serve to clarify the nature of suicide, but also enhance the subsequent moral considerations of suicide. In fact, there seems to be a consensus that most of the moral issues related, to suicide could be handled with some ease if only there were a morally-neutral definition of suicide. Or in other words, the moral conflicts over suicide which currently exist would be virtually eliminated if we could start with a morallyneutral definition of suicide.
One of the most recent exponents of this theme is Tom L. Beauchamp in his "What is Suicide?" . Mindful that since "significantly different moral, social, and legal sanctions will be implied by the classification of an act as suicide . . . the development of an adequate definition will have important practical consequences. " Beauchamp argues towards a definition of suicide thought to be relatively free of moral prejudice.
His "point is that we would be better off in discussing the moral justification of suicide if we had a more neutral concept than we in fact have."
In this essay, I will offer an alternative, stipulative definition to that of Beauchamp's, such that it not only will eliminate the controversial cases that Beauchamp's definition has trouble with, but also, is meant to increase the moral neutrality of the concept of suicide. Then I will argue that having such a definition (mine or anyone else's) is, contrary to Beauchamp's belief, of little value-for by being morally neutral, the definition loses the very quality which initially prompted us to give the concept of suicide so much of our attention.
II
Beauchamp's analysis concentrates primarily on two classes of problems associated with suicide, treatment refusal and sacrificial death. He argues that the former class of bringing about your own death is not necessarily suicide, and that the latter class is not necessarily non-suicide. The first class involves passive means to death, and even though one might desire his own death, "the 'cide' part of 'suicide 1 entails 'killingl, which is commonly contrasted with allowing to die."
As for sacrificial deaths, many are not suicides, though not for the traditional reason that the act is other-regarding, as distinct from selfregarding.
On the contrary, Beauchamp maintains that such a distinction is irrelevant, since "in such cases it cannot be said that he brings about the lifethreatening conditions causing his death in order to cause his death." Similar to the "active/passive" distinction applying to refusal of treatment cases, the important distinction for sacrificial death cases is the "caused by/caused to" distinction.
Beauchamp cites the famous case of Captain Oates as a clear instance of sacrificial suicide.
Oates, realizing that he was suffering from an illness that hindered the progress of a party attempting to make its way out of a severe blizzard, walks into the Antarctic cold to die. To take seriously as one of the conditions necessary for suicide that one's intention is directed towards the sole and final objective of bringing about one's own death has the immediate effect of restricting suicide proper to those few cases in which the agent has no purpose he wishes to achieve other than his own death.
Accordingly, someone who takes his own life in order to, for example, be rid of a specific physical or psychological state which is judged unbearable or foolish to endure, is not a suicide, for his death was used to achieve an objective which is only causally related to his killing himself, not logically identical to killing himself. Or, from another perspective, we should recognize the difference between the cessation of a particular (type of) experience, for example, pain or anguish, and the cessation of all experiences. Granted, if one brings about the absence of all experiences, there would be no particular experiences. Yet, in terms of intentions, often only some particular instance of the latter is desired, and the former is seen as merely a causal means towards its achievement.
Consider the following formulation of the intentional condition for an act of taking one's own life to be suicide proper:
The person's act of taking his own life was motivated solely by the desire to end all physical and psychological experiences. As such, the person was of such a frame of mind that no conceivable alteration in the possible consequences of the act would have been sufficient to dissuade the person from taking his own life. Accordingly, the act was not performed for the sake of anything other than the cessation of all his experiences.
The essential element is that no conceivable change in the possible results of the person's suicide would have been sufficient to alter his desire to take his own life. This means that the difference between a nonsuicide instance of taking one's own life and suicide proper is that only in the former case would an agent change his mind about killing himself if convinced that the expected specific consequences of bringing about his own death would not obtain or would be other than expected.
For example, one who is set on killing himself in order to produce a sense of guilt with his family, would not actually take his own life if he had reasons to believe that such a result would not follow from his act. It would seem to follow that in the case of a person taking his own life, for example, in order to be rid of pain or anguish, it should equally be judged not a suicide, for such a case also involves the instrumental factor of doing X (taking one's own life) in order to achieve Y (the absence of pain or anguish). To appreciate this claim requires that a distinction be kept between the achievement or cessation of a particular (type of) experience, be it one's own or another's, and the cessation of all of one's experiences.
Only when the latter is sought for its own sake do we have an instance of suicide proper. On this point, Beauchamp was conspicuously inconsistentfor while he uses the presence of the instrumental factor as the reason a given case is not a suicide, his definition of suicide is ambiguous as to the possible relevance of whether one's.death, to be suicide, has to be sought for itself only.
Ill
In this section I wish to examine critically the notion that to the degree that one is able to start with a morally-neutral concept of suicide, then to that extent one can expect subsequent success in unravelling the complex moral issue associated with suicide. I have tried to offer such a morally-neutral understanding of suicide. Whether it is accepted as such is not pertinent to this section, for it is the general notion that it would be beneficial to have such a concept that will be at issue.
For an act description to be morally-neutral is to be characterized in such a way that the act's possible rightness or wrongness depends upon additional information.
For Perhaps the makings of a solution are hinted at in the prior reference to the difference between stating what is not the case and lying. And I suggest that for our purpose the importance is in the distinction between a more general as compared to a more specific act description. As such the more general (stating what is not the case) can accommodate a greater number as well as variety of instances than can the more specific (lying) act description. Yet, as we previously discovered, the general act description is also the morally-neutral characterization. Therefore, one way to distinguish suicide proper from a moral evaluation of it is by defining suicide in terms of a general act description. Now the most obvious move would be to define suicide as either the taking of one's own life or the bringing about of one's own death. But due to the lack of any further specifications, this would allow for not only certain accidental deaths to be labeled suicides, but also it ignores the important distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental acts of killing oneself. To correct these two faults our definition must be made more precise, more specific. However this is where and how we ran into trouble before, for each of the disputants had their own set of conditions for what makes an act of taking one's own life a suicide.
Also, at this level we were told that the competing concepts of suicide were too value-laden, not morallyneutral enough. This was then rectified by the stipulative definition of suicide which required that the act of killing oneself be solely for the sake of terminating all of one's experiences.
Therefore, we once again have a morally-neutral definition, but this time in terms of a very specific act description. Now let us examine what we have to give up or assume in order to achieve this new morally-neutral concept of suicide, and determine whether it is really any more serviceable than the overly general concept of suicide as killing oneself. First of all, even to request, not to mention achieve, a morally-neutral conception of suicide presupposes some form of the fact/value dichotomy. According to those who hold to such a bifurcation, issues of truth and falsity are restricted to the former realm, while value considerations must make it independent of any epistemological standards.
Extended, this theory would have us believe that there are basically three sorts of categorizations: purely factual (e.g., swans cannot fly); purely evaluative (e.g., swans are beautiful); and evaluation based on factual beliefs (e.g., swans do not make good pets). Now to request a morally-neutral description of suicide is to say that we should strip away all evaluations previously associated with the concept, leaving the purely factual characteristics.
Yet does this request make sense? Consider the socalled value-neutral concept of truth. Truth is considered value-neutral because it is said to be restricted to the factual realm. To be value-neutral, as I understand it, would be to lack any general type of good or bad characteristics. Therefore, apparently the characteristic of being superior to falsehood should be seen as merely a non-essential, evaluative addition to the concept of truth. That is, allegedly, truth can be fully and properly characterized without any reference to being superior to ,or better than falsehood.
I find this analysis absurd. Consider another example. Peter Goldstone in his response to Daniel Pekarsky's paper on education and manipulation, argues that the debate over what a person is, . . is not to be settled by an analysis of the common sense notion of a person, for the criteria implicit in the use of that term do not incline us persuasively in one direction or the other. The lesson is to be learned from Collingwood is that to the extent that one removes a concept from its normal context, to that degree one has distorted the meaning and status of the concept. Finally, H.
I. Brown has made the same point as Collingwood in his treatment of being rational. Substituting 'suicide' for 'rational' the argument is that suicide is "a concept that does not exist in isolation, but is intimately linked 2Q to a variety of other concepts in a Quinean net", such that to judge a given act as a suicide is to make a claim that not only presupposes certain fundamental principles, but also has serious consequences for our understanding of human conduct.
Addressing the same issue from still another perspective, Hyland reminds us that . when a Catholic says that X has committed suicide he is not making a purely factual statement.
The statement is already imbued with moral significance to the effect that, within the Catholic community, suicide is considered to be morally wrong.
And this is not an isolated example nor is it unique to certain points of view. Gellner observes that "fundamental moral approval is constitutive of this, that or the other conceptualisation (in effectconstruction) of the world 22 and thus is welded to the objects it has constructed." Stated quite succinctly the point is that "the most important moraloissues are prejudged by the time we identify objects." What I take to be common to these arguments and observations is that more often than not the very reason we sense a need to attempt a so-called valuefree explication of a given concept is exactly why such an explication is not possible. That is to say, it is due to their being moral-laden that certain concepts initially prompt our need for and desire to clarify them; and then in our misguided method of clarification we attempt to rid these concepts of the very moral characteristics which initiated our inquiry.
It is not realizing this methodological flaw that accounts for Beauchamp and others questing after the neutrality of moral-laden concepts. The crucial point is to appreciate that the vast majority of concepts that are germane to value and moral issues cannot be successfully or properly explicated in neutral terms, for all such attempts require the falsifying procedure of abstracting.
Furthermore, all attempts at a neutral-analysis of moral-laden concepts result either in failure or in a empty notion: while such an attempt is unsuccessful if the concept retains value or value related characteristics, an attempt yields an empty notion to the extent that it is so general (e.g., suicide as killing oneself) or so so specific (e.g., suicide as the intentional taking of one's life solely for the sake of dying) that there is nothing left to which value considerations can be applied.
As the final (and yet perhaps principal) reason for insisting that the concept of suicide is moral-laden, consider the impossibility of neutralizing or eliminating the ethical aspect of whether, and to what degree, there is a ground for respecting human life (or, if preferred, whether, and to what extent, there is a right to human life). The point is that the issue of respect for (or right of) human life is an ethical issue, and as such, any act of taking a human life, for example, suicide, is a matter which clearly falls within the domain of ethics.
The above analysis produces a dilemma. Either one is successful or not successful in formulating a netural explication of the concept of suicide. If one is successful, then there is nothing available to which we can attach moral considerations. On the contrary, if one is able morally to consider the concept of suicide, it is because the concept has not been rendered neutral. Therefore, Beauchamp and 
